## 1NC- Truth Testing

### 1NC- Truth Testing- Short [1:20]

#### The role of the ballot is to determine the truth or falsity of the resolution, not desirability:

#### 1. Text- Five dictionaries [<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate>] define to negate as to deny the truth of, which means the sole neg burden is to prove the resolution’s falsity. My interp is key to common useage- moral judgements are objective statements capable of being only true or false

**Tannsjo** [, Torbjörn [Department of Philosophy, University of Stockholm]. From Reasons to Norms: On the Basic Question in Ethics. Springer. 2010. pg. 41. Tännsjö ]

Now, the semantic aspect of this question seems to me simple. It is obvious, that when we pass moral judgements to the effect that certain actions are right, other actions wrong, and so forth, then we intend to make objective judgements capable of being true or false. It is also clear, I think, that we make judgements that are not merely descriptive of empirical realities. For example, moral judgements are not elliptical, saying things like, according to the norms existing in my society, this action is right or wrong or, this action is liked, or disliked, by me. It is noteworthy that even a philosopher like John Mackie, who thought that there are no objective moral facts, thought that, in issuing moral judgements, we imply (wrongly) that such facts exist. Why should we draw the conclusion that our moral judgements are objective (in intent)? Well, it is sufficient to observe carefully how we make these judgements, and how we react to moral phenomena such as moral disagreement, and (putative) moral mistakes. When we run upon conflicting moral judgements we believe that both parties cannot be right. Why don’t we believe that they can? The best explanation is that we take them to make objective and contradictory judgements. But, if we run upon inconsistent judgements, at least one judgement must be false. And we often feel that we come to the conclusion [conclude] that what we once believed was a proper moral judgement was, upon closer inspection, not a proper one. We then tend to believe, not only that we judged the case differently before, but that, before, we judged it wrongly. This means that we assume that there is a fact of the matter to be right or wrong about.

#### Any other paradigm is not based in common usage of moral judgements, making it unpredictable. Textuality is key to fairness because it forms basis of mutual preround prep

#### 2. Philosophical education- comparing worlds only evaluates post fait states of affairs, which excludes all but consequentialist positions.

Alexander and Moore 12 [Alexander, Larry and Moore, Michael, "Deontological Ethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/ethics-deontological/>. RP 3/13/14 ]

Because **deontological theories are** best **understood in contrast to consequentialist** ones, a brief look at consequentialism and a survey of the problems with it that motivate its deontological opponents, provides a helpful prelude to taking up deontological theories themselves. **Consequentialists** **hold** that choices—**acts** and/or intentions—**are to be** morally **assessed** **solely by** the **states of affairs** they bring about. Consequentialists thus must specify initially the states of affairs that are intrinsically valuable—often called, collectively, “the Good.” They then are in a position to assert that whatever choices increase the Good, that is, bring about more of it, are the choices that it is morally right to make and to execute. (The Good in that sense is said to be prior to “the Right.”)Consequentialists can and do differ widely in terms of specifying the Good. Some consequentialists are monists about the Good. Utilitarians, for example, identify the Good with pleasure, happiness, desire satisfaction, or “welfare” in some other sense. Other consequentialists are pluralists regarding the Good. Some of such pluralists believe that how the Good is distributed among persons (or all sentient beings) is itself partly constitutive of the Good, whereas conventional utilitarians merely add or average each person's share of the Good to achieve the Good's maximization. Moreover, there are some consequentialists who hold that the doing or refraining from doing, of certain kinds of acts are themselves intrinsically valuable states of affairs constitutive of the Good. An example of this is the positing of rights not being violated, or duties being kept, as part of the Good to be maximized—the so-called “utilitarianism of rights” (Nozick 1974). None of these pluralist positions erase the difference between consequentialism and deontology. For the essence of consequentialism is still present in such positions: an action would be right only insofar as it maximizes these Good-making states of affairs being caused to exist. However much consequentialists differ about what the Good consists in, they all agree that the morally right choices are those that increase (either directly or indirectly) the Good. Moreover, consequentialists generally agree that the Good is “agent-neutral” (Parfit 1984; Nagel 1986). That is, valuable states of affairs are states of affairs that all agents have reason to achieve without regard to whether such states of affairs are achieved through the exercise of one's own agency or not. Consequentialism is frequently criticized on a number of grounds. Two of these are particularly apt for revealing the temptations motivating the alternative approach to deontic ethics that is deontology. The two criticisms pertinent here are that consequentialism is, on the one hand, overly demanding, and, on the other hand, that it is not demanding enough. The criticism regarding extreme demandingness runs like this: for consequentialists, there is no realm of moral permissions, no realm of going beyond one's moral duty (supererogation), no realm of moral indifference. All acts are seemingly either required or forbidden. And there also seems to be no space for the consequentialist in which to show partiality to one's own projects or to one's family, friends, and countrymen, leading some critics of consequentialism to deem it a profoundly alienating and perhaps self-effacing moral theory (Williams 1973). On the other hand, consequentialism is also criticized for what it seemingly permits. It seemingly demands (and thus, of course, permits) that in certain circumstances innocents be killed, beaten, lied to, or deprived of material goods to produce greater benefits for others. **Consequences—and only consequences**—can conceivably **justify *any***kind of **act**, for it does not matter how harmful it is to some so long as it is more beneficial to others. A well-worn example of this over-permissiveness of consequentialism is that of a case standardly called, Transplant. A surgeon has five patients dying of organ failure and one healthy patient whose organs can save the five. In the right circumstances, surgeon will be permitted (and indeed required) by consequentialism to kill the healthy patient to obtain his organs, assuming there are no relevant consequences other than the saving of the five and the death of the one. Likewise, consequentialism will permit (in a case that we shall call, Fat Man) that a fat man be pushed in front of a runaway trolley if his being crushed by the trolley will halt its advance towards five workers trapped on the track. We shall return to these examples later on. Consequentialists are of course not bereft of replies to these two criticisms. Some retreat from maximizing the Good to “satisficing”—that is, making the achievement of only a certain level of the Good mandatory (Slote 1984). This move opens up some space for personal projects and relationships, as well as a realm of the morally permissible. It is not clear, however, that satisficing is adequately motivated, except to avoid the problems of maximizing. Nor is it clear that the level of mandatory satisficing can be nonarbitrarily specified, or that satisficing will not require deontological constraints to protect satisficers from maximizers. Another move is to introduce a positive/negative duty distinction within consequentialism. On this view, our (negative) duty is not to make the world worse by actions having bad consequences; lacking is a corresponding (positive) duty to make the world better by actions having good consequences (Bentham 1789 (1948); Quinton 2007). We thus have a consequentialist duty not to kill the one in Transplant or in Fat Man; and there is no counterbalancing duty to save five that overrides this. Yet as with the satisficing move, it is unclear how a consistent consequentialist can motivate this restriction on all-out optimization of the Good. Yet another idea popular with consequentialists is to move from consequentialism as a theory that directly assesses*acts*to consequentialism as a theory that directly assesses*rules*—or character-trait inculcation—and assesses acts only indirectly by reference to such rules (or character-traits) (Alexander 1985). Its proponents contend that indirect consequentialism can avoid the criticisms of direct (act) consequentialism because it will not legitimate egregious violations of ordinary moral standards—e.g., the killing of the innocent to bring about some better state of affairs—nor will it be overly demanding and thus alienating each of us from our own projects. The relevance here of these defensive maneuvers by consequentialists is their common attempt to mimic the intuitively plausible aspects of a non-consequentialist, deontological approach to ethics. For as we shall now explore, the strengths of deontological approaches lies: (1) in their categorical prohibition of actions like the killing of innocents, even when good consequences are in the offing; and (2) in their permission to each of us to pursue our own projects free of any constant demand that we shape those projects so as to make everyone else well off. 2. Deontological Theories Having now briefly taken a look at deontologists' foil, consequentialist theories of right action, we turn now to examine deontological theories. In contrast to consequentialist theories, **deontological theories judge** the **morality of choices by criteria different from** the **states of affairs** those choices bring about. The most familiar forms of deontology, and also the forms presenting the greatest contrast to consequentialism, hold that some **choices cannot be justified** by their **effects**—that **no matter how** morally **good their consequences,** some choices are morally forbidden. On such familiar deontological accounts of morality, agents cannot make certain wrongful choices even if by doing so the number of those exact kinds of wrongful choices will be minimized (because other agents will be prevented from engaging in similar wrongful choices). For such deontologists, what makes a choice right is its conformity with a moral norm. Such norms are to be simply obeyed by each moral agent; such norm-keepings are not to be maximized by each agent. In this sense, for such deontologists, the Right is said to have priority over the Good. If an act is not in accord with the Right, it may not be undertaken, no matter the Good that it might produce (including even a Good consisting of acts in accordance with the Right).

#### This outweighs

#### A. Controls internal link to topic education, real world and critical thinking—it determines how we are able to interpret the resolution through differnet manners

#### B. Portable- phil. Is a portable skill that we will be able to implement in our everyday lives in the future- that’s key to actual decision making

#### 3. Jurisdiction- it’s the only possible conclusion of the rules given to us prior to the round- otherwise it alters the activity itself

**Branse 15** [, 9-4-2015, (Universtiy Debater, TOC Finalist) "The Role of the Judge By David Branse (Part One)," NSD Update, <http://nsdupdate.com/2015/09/04/the-role-of-the-judge-by-david-branse-part-one/>] NB

To determine who is better at something requires normative assessments about the rules of the activity – the winner of a competitive activity is the one who follows the rules and procedures to victory. The better soccer team is the team that scores more goals according to the rules of soccer and the better chess player is the person who achieves checkmate by moving their pieces in accordance with the rules of chess. Any competitive activity’s evaluation of the “better participant” is constrained by the rules that govern the activity. The constraining role of an activity’s rules can answer a couple of common claims for education’s value and the judge as an educator. First, a common reason to view education as “a voter” is a combination of the following: Argument 1: A) education is valuable, and B) debate is a unique space to provide that education. To see how this claim is mistaken consider the follow example: It seems apparent that two claims are true: 1) exercise is valuable, and 2) soccer is an activity structured in such a way that can easily facilitate exercise. This, however, does not seem to be a strong enough reason to make the claim that: “the referee should be a facilitator of exercise”. Intuitively, if one team scored more goals than another team that happened to hustle far more, the proper response is to reward the goal-scoring team the win. There doesn’t seem to be a compelling reason to promote exercise just because exercise can easily be promoted. This is because pragmatic benefits are constrained by the rules of the activity. Exercise or education should not be promoted at the expense of the rules since the rules are what define the activity. LD is only LD because of the rules governing it – if we changed the activity to promoting practical values, then it would cease to be what it is. As soon as referees reward teams that hustle more with the win, the game is no longer soccer, but some new sport that rewards hustle rather than goal scoring. At best, the claim in Argument 1 merely justifies why the rules of debate should change; however, that does not bear any claim to who should win a round. A much stronger claim made for education is as follows: Argument 2: Debate was designed to be educational At first glance, this argument seems intuitive. If debate was designed to be educational, then surely our rules should just be to promote that educational objective. This, however, incorrectly understands the nature of activities. Once again, an example will help illustrate this problem: Although the rules of chess were probably designed to provide an intellectually stimulating game (and for the sake of argument, let’s assume they were), this does not tell you how to play the game. Imagine that a player makes an illegal move and argues that it should be allowed because it will make the resulting position more intellectually challenging. The proper response is to forbid it. Internal rules of an activity are absolute. From the perspective of the players, the authority of the rules are non-optional. The argument the player made could only be a reason to reform the rules outside the round.[[1]](http://nsdupdate.com/2015/09/04/the-role-of-the-judge-by-david-branse-part-one/#_ftn1) Even if debate was designed to be educational, if the rules of debate don’t mandate voting on education, then the judge does not have the jurisdiction to do it. In fact, rules probably shouldn’t exclusively actualize the reason for their instantiation. If chess rules said, “be intellectually stimulating” instead of “move pieces certain ways”, the resulting game would end up being less intellectually stimulating. In the same way, if debate should be educational, a rule of “promoting (or voting on) education” is probably counter-productive. The process of saying something is educational so we should be bound to talking about it limits the range of arguments available. Education arises after the fact: the process itself provides education; we receive value from truth testing. I will elaborate on this argument in more detail in later sections. Thus, from an internal perspective – the perspective of an agent involved in the activity – rules are more important than the purpose of creating the rules in the first place. Within the debate, the judge is bound by the established rules. If the rules are failing their function, that can be a reason to change the rules outside of the round. However, in round acts are out of the judge’s jurisdiction.

### 1NC- Truth Testing- Long [2:00]

#### The role of the ballot is to determine the truth or falsity of the resolution, not desirability:

#### 1. Text- Five dictionaries [<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate>] define to negate as to deny the truth of, which means the sole neg burden is to prove the resolution’s falsity. My interp is key to common useage- moral judgements are objective statements capable of being only true or false

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#### Any other paradigm is not based in common usage of moral judgements, making it unpredictable. Textuality is key to fairness because it forms basis of mutual preround prep. That outweighs:

#### A. Controls internal link- ground is meaningless if debaters can’t predict it going into the round, so only a predictable interp allows ground.

#### B. Strength of link- arguments that prove the resolution’s desirability are still offense under truth testing, since the normative framework makes the evaluating normative judgement true. My itnerp is net preferable because truth teting excludes neither debater’s ground- but comparative worlds exludes mine

#### C. Direct abuse- their arg is a potential abuse claim about practices that truth testing might allow- but my abuse claim points out specific argumetns that I can read.

#### 2. Philosophical education- comparing worlds only evaluates post fait states of affairs, which excludes all but consequentialist positions.

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It seemingly demands (and thus, of course, permits) that in certain circumstances innocents be killed, beaten, lied to, or deprived of material goods to produce greater benefits for others. **Consequences—and only consequences**—can conceivably **justify *any***kind of **act**, for it does not matter how harmful it is to some so long as it is more beneficial to others. A well-worn example of this over-permissiveness of consequentialism is that of a case standardly called, Transplant. A surgeon has five patients dying of organ failure and one healthy patient whose organs can save the five. In the right circumstances, surgeon will be permitted (and indeed required) by consequentialism to kill the healthy patient to obtain his organs, assuming there are no relevant consequences other than the saving of the five and the death of the one. Likewise, consequentialism will permit (in a case that we shall call, Fat Man) that a fat man be pushed in front of a runaway trolley if his being crushed by the trolley will halt its advance towards five workers trapped on the track. We shall return to these examples later on. Consequentialists are of course not bereft of replies to these two criticisms. Some retreat from maximizing the Good to “satisficing”—that is, making the achievement of only a certain level of the Good mandatory (Slote 1984). This move opens up some space for personal projects and relationships, as well as a realm of the morally permissible. It is not clear, however, that satisficing is adequately motivated, except to avoid the problems of maximizing. Nor is it clear that the level of mandatory satisficing can be nonarbitrarily specified, or that satisficing will not require deontological constraints to protect satisficers from maximizers. 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Such norms are to be simply obeyed by each moral agent; such norm-keepings are not to be maximized by each agent. In this sense, for such deontologists, the Right is said to have priority over the Good. If an act is not in accord with the Right, it may not be undertaken, no matter the Good that it might produce (including even a Good consisting of acts in accordance with the Right).

#### This outweighs:

#### A. Framers intent is the tiebreaker- LD is distinct from other activities because of the normative terms in the resolution, that means err towards the side of promoting the original purpose of the activity, since the framers made an informed decision after longer deliberation.

#### B. Strength of link- topical debate is real and an option under our interp- they foreclose debating phil. My interp combines the best of both worlds- even if there’s less topical debate, the structural exclusion of philosophy outweighs

#### C. Controls internal link to topic education, real world and critical thinking—it determines how we are able to interpret the resolution through differnet manners

#### D. Uniqueness- philosophy within debate is dying currently, we need to reclaim it and only this paradigm can do so

#### E. Portable- phil. Is a portable skill that we will be able to implement in our everyday lives in the future- that’s key to actual decision making

#### 3. Jurisdiction- it’s the only possible conclusion of the rules given to us prior to the round- otherwise it alters the activity itself

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To determine who is better at something requires normative assessments about the rules of the activity – the winner of a competitive activity is the one who follows the rules and procedures to victory. The better soccer team is the team that scores more goals according to the rules of soccer and the better chess player is the person who achieves checkmate by moving their pieces in accordance with the rules of chess. Any competitive activity’s evaluation of the “better participant” is constrained by the rules that govern the activity. The constraining role of an activity’s rules can answer a couple of common claims for education’s value and the judge as an educator. First, a common reason to view education as “a voter” is a combination of the following: Argument 1: A) education is valuable, and B) debate is a unique space to provide that education. To see how this claim is mistaken consider the follow example: It seems apparent that two claims are true: 1) exercise is valuable, and 2) soccer is an activity structured in such a way that can easily facilitate exercise. This, however, does not seem to be a strong enough reason to make the claim that: “the referee should be a facilitator of exercise”. Intuitively, if one team scored more goals than another team that happened to hustle far more, the proper response is to reward the goal-scoring team the win. There doesn’t seem to be a compelling reason to promote exercise just because exercise can easily be promoted. This is because pragmatic benefits are constrained by the rules of the activity. Exercise or education should not be promoted at the expense of the rules since the rules are what define the activity. LD is only LD because of the rules governing it – if we changed the activity to promoting practical values, then it would cease to be what it is. As soon as referees reward teams that hustle more with the win, the game is no longer soccer, but some new sport that rewards hustle rather than goal scoring. At best, the claim in Argument 1 merely justifies why the rules of debate should change; however, that does not bear any claim to who should win a round. A much stronger claim made for education is as follows: Argument 2: Debate was designed to be educational At first glance, this argument seems intuitive. If debate was designed to be educational, then surely our rules should just be to promote that educational objective. This, however, incorrectly understands the nature of activities. Once again, an example will help illustrate this problem: Although the rules of chess were probably designed to provide an intellectually stimulating game (and for the sake of argument, let’s assume they were), this does not tell you how to play the game. Imagine that a player makes an illegal move and argues that it should be allowed because it will make the resulting position more intellectually challenging. The proper response is to forbid it. Internal rules of an activity are absolute. From the perspective of the players, the authority of the rules are non-optional. The argument the player made could only be a reason to reform the rules outside the round.[[1]](http://nsdupdate.com/2015/09/04/the-role-of-the-judge-by-david-branse-part-one/" \l "_ftn1) Even if debate was designed to be educational, if the rules of debate don’t mandate voting on education, then the judge does not have the jurisdiction to do it. In fact, rules probably shouldn’t exclusively actualize the reason for their instantiation. If chess rules said, “be intellectually stimulating” instead of “move pieces certain ways”, the resulting game would end up being less intellectually stimulating. In the same way, if debate should be educational, a rule of “promoting (or voting on) education” is probably counter-productive. The process of saying something is educational so we should be bound to talking about it limits the range of arguments available. Education arises after the fact: the process itself provides education; we receive value from truth testing. I will elaborate on this argument in more detail in later sections. Thus, from an internal perspective – the perspective of an agent involved in the activity – rules are more important than the purpose of creating the rules in the first place. Within the debate, the judge is bound by the established rules. If the rules are failing their function, that can be a reason to change the rules outside of the round. However, in round acts are out of the judge’s jurisdiction.